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 Chapter 8 
 Transitional Justice in Times of “Exponential 
Change”: Constructing Normative 
Frameworks Fit for Purpose—The 
Importance of General International Law 
 Duncan  French and  Katja  Samuel 
 Abstract  In the attempt to reformulate transitional justice to include broader rule 
of law approaches, there are substantial challenges in ensuring institutional, norma-
tive, and policy coherence. Though the rhetoric of the UN policy “pillars” of human 
rights, development, and peace and security is uncontroversial and commendable, 
achieving it through tangential legal regimes is problematic. With at least three 
forms of incoherence at work: within a regime, between legal regimes, and between 
regimes and the UN’s policy goals, ensuring effective responses requires resort to 
tools of general international law. The chapter comes to three conclusions: fi rst, that 
as achieving transitional justice requires reliance upon divergent areas of interna-
tional law, general issues of normative ordering and fragmentation must be con-
fronted. Secondly, normative incoherence can be mitigated through a range of 
general techniques, including the development of unifi ed substantive (“primary”) 
rules across regimes—using the principle of prevention here as the example—and 
recourse to treaty interpretation as a secondary tool to maximise rule-linkage. 
Thirdly, there are a number of meta-, or overriding, principles which might assist 
with developing an overarching coherence, including the concept of sustainable 
development and various principles of human rights. Thus, transitional justice as both 
a policy and legal objective should not eschew, and indeed benefi ts from, precepts 
and techniques of the general legal order. 
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 Introduction 
 This chapter examines how recent trends within the UN system to expand and 
strengthen rule of law approaches to more broadly defi ned, and reprioritized, 
security threats has impacted upon the conceptual foundations and normative 
frameworks surrounding transitional justice. As has been well-documented, 
though transitional justice has traditionally been confi ned to narrowly construed 
post- military force restructuring—primarily relating to matters of criminal jus-
tice, some civil and political human rights, and issues of peace and reconcilia-
tion—a plethora of newer approaches are now being included under the rule of 
law rubric, thereby broadening the scope of both the political and the academic 
debate. 
 Notwithstanding such developments, and with particular regard to the normative 
frameworks that mediate between transitional justice and the rule of law, substan-
tial, as well as substantive, issues remain as to the coherence and effectiveness of the 
structure that is currently in place. While the international community increasingly 
has the appropriate rhetoric, premised around the three pillars of the UN system—
development, peace and security, and human rights—the contribution of associated 
legal regimes and institutional processes to these policy-objectives and the gover-
nance synergies between them seem decidedly less apparent. Despite these pillars 
being invariably viewed as being indivisible and interrelated, there is rarely any 
explanation as to what this might mean in terms of the relationship between the 
parallel, often quite distinctive, legal norms that relate—sometimes directly, often 
tangentially—these broader objectives. 
 In short, this chapter explores the argument whether there is a lack of norma-
tive linkage and overarching principle(s) between those areas of international 
law that are central to the achievement of these broader rule of law approaches 
to transitional justice, most notably human rights, and principles relating to 
peace and security, the environment, and development. As will become clear, 
one of the fundamental strengths of newer approaches to transitional justice is 
to mainstream, rather than fragment, the applicable law and thus our argument 
is invariably grounded in general international law. For the sake of clarity, but 
also recognising its signifi cance, the chapter thus uses a broadly conceived prin-
ciple of prevention to illustrate the central function of substantive rules in con-
tributing to transitional justice. Recognising divergences in approach, the 
chapter then addresses how international law’s own internal processes—most 
notably interpretation—may be able to resolve or at least reduce the challenges 
posed by existing fragmented understandings. The chapter then concludes by 
returning to the issue of transitional justice and considers how a more integrated 
approach should support the attainment of post-confl ict development. For other-
wise, international law is not serving the policy goals that the international com-
munity has itself expressly sought; thus raising the broader question as to its fi tness 
for purpose. 
D. French and K. Samuel
187
 Context 
 There is no universally agreed defi nition of, or fi xed parameters for, “transitional 
justice”. It is, however, generally accepted that the concept is concerned with ensur-
ing adequate “accountability and fairness in the protection and vindication of rights 
and the prevention and punishment of wrongs”. 1 Thus, as traditionally understood, 
it has focused on the creation, and implementation, of mechanisms for as long as it 
is necessary to adequately confront wrongdoers during a period that is often accom-
panied by transition in the form of political change. 2 Since matters of transitional 
justice normally arise in the context of the aftermath of the perpetration of extreme 
human rights violations—such as genocide, crimes against humanity, and war 
crimes—it is unsurprising that historically the primary focus has been on the associ-
ated legal regimes of international human rights, humanitarian, criminal, and refu-
gee law. 3 As Louise Arbour argued in 2006, the parameters of transitional justice 
have often been very narrowly set as criminal law notions of justice, which in turn 
can be refl ected within restrictive interpretative approaches to their accompanying 
legal regimes, notably insuffi cient attention being paid to violations of economic, 
social, and cultural rights. In response, she advocated the adoption of a much 
broader  approach:
 Transitional justice must have the ambition of assisting the transformation of oppressed 
societies into free ones by addressing the injustices of the past through measures that will 
procure an equitable future. It must reach to, but also beyond the crimes and abuses com-
mitted during the confl ict which led to the transition, into the human rights violations that 
pre-existed the confl ict and caused, or contributed to it. When making that search, it is 
likely that one would expose a great number of violations of economic, social and cultural 
(ESC) rights and discriminatory practices. 4 
 In doing so, Arbour argued that transitional justice situations should afford 
opportunities to better integrate ESC rights with the legal, political, and social con-
structs of society, thereby affording “justice” its full meaning. 5 Furthermore, no 
hierarchy of rights should exist between ESC and other rights. 6 At the very least, 
sound instrumental reasons for doing so exist, not only to enable “all human rights 
violations [to be treated] in an integrated and interdependent manner”, 7 but also 
since “transitional justice’s additional objective of bringing about social transforma-
tion that will prevent a resurgence of confl ict” requires addressing all sources of 
1  UN Rule of Law and Transitional Justice Report, para 7. 
2  Roht-Arriaza and Mariezcurrena 2006, 1. 
3  UN Rule of Law and Transitional Justice Report 2004, para 7. 
4 Arbour 2006, 2. 
5 Arbour 2006, 16. 
6 Arbour 2006, 15. 
7  One signifi cant obstacle she identifi es is that ESC rights are often treated and misunderstood as 
being aspirational rather than legally enforceable rights, Arbour 2006, 7. 
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legitimate grievances, 8 as well as potential future triggers, for example resource 
scarcity or inequity. 
 Since these observations were made in 2006, there have been some positive steps 
in the direction of broadening the concept of transitional justice to consider ESC 
factors more adequately, though not yet as human rights violations or potential 
crimes as suggested by Arbour. This was especially evident in the updated report on 
“Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Confl ict and Post-Confl ict Societies” 
issued in 2011. 9 The 2011 report stated that: the UN “is increasingly focused on 
emerging threats to the rule of law, such as organised crime and illicit traffi cking, 
and the root causes of confl ict, including economic and social justice issues. These 
efforts are proving to be indispensable to a wider peace and security agenda”, 10 
particularly since “festering grievances based on violations of economic and social 
rights are increasingly recognised for their potential to spark violent confl ict”. 11 In 
doing so, there is recognition that “greater efforts are needed to ensure a unifi ed 
approach to the rule of law…[including] integrat[ing] security sector reform into the 
wider rule of law framework”. 12 
 Of particular note to the current discussion, the UN Secretary-General expressed 
that the UN would “support initiatives to strengthen the development approach to 
the rule of law”, 13 for example through developing policies on access to justice 
linked to the promotion of social and economic rights. 14 This is an essential element 
of transitional justice responses—in parallel with existing criminal justice, peace 
and reconciliation approaches—if they are to be more effective in the longer term, 
with both national, as well as wider peace and security, benefi ts. Some specifi c areas 
highlighted by the report included rule of law reform, economic development 
(accompanied by increased technical understanding of international trade law to, 
for example, facilitate effective investment), employment, and democratic gover-
nance. 15 The UN has also undertaken a number of policy as well as practical steps 
towards realising this broader concept of transitional justice. A notable one was the 
establishment of the Rule of Law Coordination and Resource Group, an inter- 
agency mechanism responsible for the overall coordination and coherence of rule of 
law within the UN system. 16 
 These developments regarding transitional justice approaches need, of course, to be 
located within wider international discourse and trends regarding the rule of law, as well 
as broader, more integral approaches to the concept of security and causes of insecurity. 
Although traditional normative constructs regarding the use of (and restrictions on) 
8 Arbour 2006, 4–5. 
9  UN Rule of Law and Transitional Justice 2011. 
10  UN Rule of Law and Transitional Justice 2011, 3 para 4. 
11  UN Rule of Law and Transitional Justice 2011, 14 para 51. 
12  UN Rule of Law and Transitional Justice 2011, 3 para 4. 
13  UN Rule of Law and Transitional Justice, 19 para 79. 
14  UN Rule of Law and Transitional Justice 2011, 19 para 80. 
15  UN Rule of Law and Transitional Justice 2011, 6 para 17, 15 para 52. 
16  UN Rule of Law and Transitional Justice 2011, 15 para 56. 
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the use of military force by sovereign States including during times of confl ict, and 
the apparent mutual benefi t of the  lex pacis during times of peace, remain of great 
importance, emphasis is increasingly placed upon the apparently “softer” notion of 
human insecurity. While both are dichotomies of security and insecurity, what is 
of particular concern here is how to fuse together these very different paradigms and 
associated legal regimes to produce a robust, coherent normative framework that is 
fi t for purpose to meet broader transitional justice objectives. 
 Recent high-level UN outputs have sought to articulate these shifting priorities 
and related challenges, including the UN Secretary-General’s Action Agenda 2012 
for the next 5 years (UN Action Agenda 2012), and “The Future We Want”—the 
outcome document from the 2012 UN (Rio 20+) Conference on Sustainable 
Development (Future We Want 2012). It is notable that with respect to the former, 
it is signifi cant that the Secretary-General identifi ed his number one priority as 
being sustainable development, the successful attainment of which is critical to 
human security, and in turn the prevention of confl icts. 17 Thus, since sustainable 
development is also foundational to the second output, it would seem important to 
refl ect further on the meaning and relevance of the concept, which is dealt with in 
more detail below. 
 Sustainable development has now become an accepted aspect of mainstream 
international diplomacy, having initially been developed within the more limited 
parameters of the emerging framework of international environmental law in the 
early 1990s. Of particular signifi cance in the transition of sustainable development 
from a narrow mediating concept between environmental protection and economic 
development towards a more all-encompassing meta-principle, including in matters 
of social justice, was the 2002 Johannesburg Summit on Sustainable Development. 18 
Though the 1992 “Rio” Declaration included reference to the fact that “Peace, 
development and environmental protection are interdependent and indivisible”, 19 
this was at best inchoate and aspirational. On the other hand, by 2002, particularly 
following other global conferences on social development and human rights in the 
1990s as well as the formulation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 
the Johannesburg outcomes were more ably to express the links between gover-
nance and participation, development and environmental protection. More specifi -
cally, the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation, as it was known, also contained 
specifi c references to the relevance of sustainable development to the matter of tran-
sitional justice, though these references were contextually limited to the African 
continent, thus questioning the principled basis on which they were made. 20 
17  UN Action Agenda Press Release 2012. 
18  How far either sustainable development or the economic basis of transitional justice is premised 
upon progress towards a particular understanding and/or model to development and economic 
growth, though this is beyond the remit of this chapter it is important to recognise the role, infl u-
ence and authority of international organisations and regional agencies, including but not limited 
to the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and the UN Development Programme. 
19  Rio Declaration 1992, principle 25. 
20  Johannesburg Plan of Implementation 2002, para 65. 
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Nevertheless, they did at least recognise the linkages between the challenges 
posed in the attainment of sustainable development and the particular context of 
transitional justice. 
 More recently, the debate has moved on again, though not coherently or with a 
joined-up approach. More positively, a high-level panel report on the MDGs has 
advocated a pressing need to adopt a broader approach to and paradigm of sustain-
able development, 21 which focuses not only on poverty-related issues but also on the 
devastating effects of confl ict and violence, as well as good governance. Signifi cantly, 
including for the purpose of the current discussion, one of the most signifi cant iden-
tifi ed shortcomings of the MDGs was the failure to “integrat[e] the economic, 
social, and environmental aspects of sustainable development as envisaged in the 
Millennium Declaration.” 22 Consequently, despite best efforts, interrelated prob-
lems—such as between the environment and development—were never properly 
integrated, thereby reducing their overall effectiveness. 23 The report also empha-
sised the need to ensure that universal human rights standards and basic economic 
opportunities are available to all as well as basic economic opportunities, 24 in addi-
tion to making advancements regarding inter alia accountable government and good 
governance. 25 These themes were then refl ected, to a greater or lesser extent, within 
“The Future We Want Outcome Document” from the Rio conference on Sustainable 
Development in 2012. 26 
 Clearly, such ambitious rhetoric and goals present signifi cant challenges, both 
for States within what might be termed the ordinary “course of events” (i.e. the 
 lex pacis ) and specifi cally for those States transitioning from a confl ict situation. 
The focus of the remainder of this chapter is therefore on whether the necessary 
normative framework to facilitate these policy objectives is currently in place; and, 
if not, how it might be better implemented. Secondary rules of treaty interpretation 
and law-reconciliation have a particularly signifi cant and infl uential role to play. 
Nevertheless, secondary rules by themselves do not achieve political outcomes. 
Thus, whereas section 5 focuses particularly on the rule of interpretation as an 
important secondary rule in international law, section 4 focuses upon one particular 
substantive principle of law and policy fundamental to supporting transitional 
justice, namely the obligation-cum-process of prevention. This is another of the UN 
Secretary-General’s priorities, which in this context includes not only traditional 
constraints upon State action in a broad fi eld of activities (e.g. human rights abuses, 
the unlawful use of force) but equally is concerned more broadly with such areas as 
“[s]upport[ing] the development and implementation of national disaster risk 
 reduction plans”, and “[b]uild[ing] resilience to external economic and fi nancial 
21  Post-2015 Development Agenda 2013, 8. 
22  Post-2015 Development Agenda 2013, 7. 
23  Post-2015 Development Agenda 2013, 7. 
24  Post-2015 Development Agenda 2013, 8. 
25  Post-2015 Development Agenda 2013, 9. 
26  Future We Want 2012, para 3. 
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shocks”. 27 However, before considering either issue, the chapter discusses the 
general normative framework that surrounds transitional justice, highlighting in 
particular the disjointed “fi t” between the policy objectives and the tangential legal 
regimes being relied upon to achieve these goals, lacking coherence within them-
selves as well as the objectives they are said to serve. 
 Normative Framework 
 In terms of the applicable normative framework for such an increasingly broad and 
integrated approach, it would seem natural to centre this on the UN’s three pillars: 
development, peace and security, and human rights. Certainly, this is refl ected in, for 
example, the Rio Outcome Document which expressly “reaffi rm[s] the importance 
of freedom, peace and security, respect for all human rights, including the right to 
development and the right to an adequate standard of living, including the right to food, 
the rule of law, gender equality, women’s empowerment and the overall commit-
ment to just and democratic societies for development”. 28 For each of these pillars, 
there are reasonably well developed and established legal regimes, though admit-
tedly in the area of development, the vagaries of institutions, processes, and norms 
is such that it lacks much of the normative coherence of the other regimes, notably 
human rights. Notwithstanding this caveat, a key challenge therefore, which is the 
central focus here, is not the creation of new applicable norms, but how existing 
ones and inherent assumptions 29 of the regimes might link together in a suffi ciently 
systematic manner to facilitate the achievement of wider goals, policies, and prac-
tices. While there is some ongoing discussion as to how these regimes might inter-
act bilaterally—such as environmental law with human rights; and peace and 
security with human rights—not only is there much more work to be done on these 
matters, but there is signifi cantly little discussion regarding their more complex 
triangular relationship. 30 This chapter seeks to make a modest contribution in this 
regard illustrated within the context of transitional justice. 
 Young identifi es four key features that can infl uence interactions between different 
legal regimes and create associated challenges for the creation, implementation, or 
enforcement of international law:
 First, the relevant laws were largely developed at different times. Secondly, they are imple-
mented by different institutions, which have different powers of enforcement and relative 
strengths. Thirdly, there is not uniform ratifi cation of these laws by all states. They are  mostly 
27  UN Action Agenda Press Release 2012. 
28  Future We Want 2012, para 8. 
29 Young 2012, 6. 
30  UNSC Res 1963 (2010), UNSC Res 1963 (2010) states that “development, peace and security, 
and human rights are interlinked and mutually reinforcing…”. (Preamble, and similarly in para 10, 
in a counter-terrorism context), yet does not explain how this is so in terms of the normative rela-
tionship between their underpinning legal regimes. 
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agreed by the same states, of course, but there are differences, and some members meet the 
membership requirements of some but not all the relevant organisations. Fourthly….these 
laws aim to fulfi l particular sets of preferences within the international legal system, 31 
which may not be in harmony. 32 
 Related challenges are how to strengthen the frameworks within each pillar, not 
only institutionally—as highlighted, for example, in the Rio Outcome Document 
with respect to sustainable development, to strengthen coherence, coordination, and 
to avoid duplication of efforts 33 —but normatively too. Indeed the Outcome Document 
further recognised that the effective promotion of sustainable development goals 
“requires the meaningful involvement and active participation of regional, national 
and subnational legislatures and judiciaries”. 34 
 A specifi c central challenge identifi ed in the Outcome Document is that of frag-
mentation. 35 Certainly, the UN is uniquely positioned to respond to current and 
emerging global challenges, including on broadly defi ned rule of law, social, eco-
nomic, development issues, “because it can provide integrated solutions across inter-
connect issues such as development, peace and security, human rights and 
humanitarian action”. 36 Although the observation on fragmentation was made regard-
ing existing institutional frameworks it is equally true at the normative level, not only 
regarding the coherence of the relationship between principles and rules within but 
also between legal regimes. Consequently, the issues examined here need to be 
understood within the wider context of the fragmentation of international law too, 
namely tensions existing between the norms of different legal regimes which create 
divergence rather than convergence in terms of create a truly coherent system of 
international law. As Young observes, this is not simply about how legal norms may 
confl ict, but rather extends to “novel explorations of the way in which, in the default 
situation of diversity and concurrent activities, norms and institutions from disparate 
legal regimes interact”. 37 Nor can this exercise be limited to existing and emerging 
principles, but should be accompanied by often unnoticed interaction between differ-
ent legal regimes. 38 As such, the scope of enquiry here needs to extend beyond the 
parameters of the International Law Commission’s Study Group on the fragmenta-
tion of international law, which was largely confi ned to considering how to reconcile 
confl icting norms that already exist in the form of treaty or customary international 
law. Furthermore, the nature of the relationship between different legal regimes is not 
static, instead it is constantly evolving. 
 As the specifi c principle examined below reveals, that of prevention—it can 
have quite different meaning and effects within different legal regimes. In some 
31 Young 2012, 89. 
32 Young 2012, 88–89. 
33  Future We Want 2012, para 75. 
34  Future We Want 2012, para 43. 
35  Future We Want 2012, para 76(d). 
36  UN Action Agenda 2012, 1. 
37 Young 2012, 1. 
38 Young 2012, 1. 
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circumstances the general absence of a hierarchy of norms in international law with the 
exception of  jus cogens —the highest category of norms which are non-derogable 
and absolute, such as the prohibitions against torture, genocide and apartheid—
could be considered a weakness, or at least a further source of uncertainty, for example 
where confl icts of norms arise. In other circumstances, however, it could be considered 
a benefi t since it affords much fl exibility as well as creativity of approach to better 
integrate parallel norms of different legal regimes. Some suggestions as to how this 
might be possible are considered below (Section 5). 
 Nevertheless, the lack of coherence between regimes should not be underesti-
mated. As legal rules and institutions have developed endogenously from within their 
own institutional backgrounds, the lack of linkage with other legal regimes has often 
per se not been considered problematic. Indeed, as international law is characterized 
with such normative inconsistencies at all levels, it is perhaps not surprising that the 
international community struggles to develop coherent rules particularly around 
contentious issues. 
 Beyond this, there is the equally challenging matter that the UN’s “pillar” objectives 
and the associated legal regimes are just that—“associated”. The legal regimes were 
often not developed to meet the policy goals of the UN, apart from at their most 
generic level (i.e. promotion of human rights), and certainly are rarely designed to 
meet the particular challenges of new situations, notably here those associated with 
transitional justice. Thus, at best, regimes such as environmental treaties provide 
proxy support for the broader objectives of the UN, rather than being directly instru-
mental to the attainment of particular goals. 
 Consequently, there are at least three different forms of uncertainty and incoherence 
at play here: within a legal regime, between legal regimes, and between the regimes and 
“related” policy goals. Thus, when considering in section 5 the value of interpretation 
as a means of integrating norms, it will be important to keep in mind each of these 
distinctive, though related, modes of incoherence. And how far interpretation can 
stretch to accommodate each—and all—forms of fragmentation. To that extent, the 
attempt by the international community to implement the principle of prevention as 
more than a piece of rhetoric but, in fact, an overarching norm is especially 
instructive. 
 Principle of Prevention 
 The principle of prevention is one of those norms of international law which one might 
have thought was easily distinguishable and defi nable. As a reasonably “simple” 
rule in the abstract, a principle of prevention would seem a natural contender as a 
general principle of law. However, as soon as one raises this proposition, the 
problems seem almost endless: prevention of what? By whom? How? By when? 
And there are many more. Even within the context of the transitional justice context, 
whilst the principle of prevention would seem to have a clearer meaning—namely 
to prevent the recurrence of further confl ict—it fails to address many important 
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aspects, such as whether the obligation is essentially a negative one (to avoid the 
repeat use of force) or a positive one (to address the key underlying factors that led to 
confl ict in the fi rst place, as well as deal with the aftermath and resultant violations 
of international humanitarian law of the previous confl ict), or perhaps both. 
 Moreover, in addition to such uncertainty there is the broader question whether 
one can talk about a normative principle of prevention at all. Certainly, there are 
discrete preventative obligations in many areas of international law, though whether 
there is any form of connection between them is uncertain and potentially unlikely. 
To take but three examples—the poorly named “no harm” principle from interna-
tional environmental law (Rio Declaration 1992, principle 2), the duty under Article 
2(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (ICCPR) to 
“respect and to ensure” civil and political rights, and the generally accepted custom-
ary obligation that “Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, 
assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State or acqui-
escing in organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission of 
such acts” (1970 Friendly Relations Declaration). 
 As is immediately obvious, these obligations are wide-ranging in content, wording, 
and scope. Some international law obligations are extraterritorial in nature (i.e. not 
to cause transboundary harm) without a seemingly similar obligation domestically, 
whereas for other obligations, the obligation is primarily territorial (i.e. human 
rights) with a broader question as to its extraterritorial extent. Some obligations are 
primarily focused on regulating State measures (for example, direct use of force), 
others on ensuring States regulate the acts of others (for example, private actors), 
and many contain an element of both. The human rights requirement of “to respect 
and to ensure” neatly captures this dichotomous obligation. Thus, a secondary ques-
tion arises as to the expected standard of behaviour of the State when it is a private 
actor that has caused the harm, rather than the State itself. There is general, though 
universal, support for the idea of due diligence being the requisite standard, whatever 
that means in any particular context, when the State’s responsibility lies in regulation 
and enforcement, rather than primary action. 
 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to consider whether a singular principle of 
prevention can be said to exist in international law at the present time, whether gen-
erally or within specifi c contexts such as transitional justice. Rather, what is of 
importance here is that the UN policy objectives in the area would invariably seem 
to suppose the existence of such an obligation, and its absence thus creates a disjoint 
between policy goals and normative capacity. This is best illustrated by some of the 
overarching goals of prevention highlighted in the Secretary-General’s 2012 
Agenda to:
 “Support the development and implementation of national disaster risk reduction plans that 
address growing challenges of climate change, environmental degradation…”. 
 “Prioritize early warning and early action on prevention violent confl ict by….[e]nsuring 
that UN good offi ces, mediation, crisis response and peacebuilding  services are easily and 
rapidly deployable”. 
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 “Advance a preventive approach to human rights by……[d]eveloping a policy framework 
that identifi es basic elements needed to prevent human rights violations…”. 39 
 As has been commented elsewhere regarding this Agenda in the context of 
counter-terrorism:
 [I]t is essential that this agenda is not limited solely or principally to institutional and pro-
cedural aspects of the UN’s architecture, but rather that equal focus is given to its substan-
tive elements. Both are important and inherently related—measures to strengthen one limb 
will not achieve their full potential and reach without corresponding and parallel efforts 
being afforded to the other. 40 
 Since there is no one approach to the concept of prevention or related preventive 
responses within individual legal regimes, efforts to adopt a coherent, meaningful 
approach spanning numerous legal regimes is thus going to be a herculean task. 41 
Moreover, the UN goals cover a wide range of threats, from the natural to the man- 
made. Not all require a similar response, or are easily achieved. Nor is it apparent 
that law always is the most prominent, or appropriate, tool. That said, as the discus-
sion next on human rights indicates, there is signifi cant scope for prevention to play 
an important role, though the human rights regime is not without its own internal 
normative challenges. Nevertheless, despite having diverse meaning, is there scope 
for such a principle to have an even greater role in providing such connections 
between legal regimes, which are not otherwise easily interlinked, through shared—
if as yet unearthed—common assumptions to support global objectives? 
 The Principle of Prevention and the Human Rights Regime 
 As was just mentioned, one of the preventive goals identifi ed in the UN Secretary- 
General’s 2012 Agenda is to “[a]dvance a preventive approach to human rights 
by……[d]eveloping a policy framework that identifi es basic elements needed to 
prevent human rights violations…”. A primary, overarching goal of human rights 
principles and rules is to prevent the occurrence of human rights violations in the 
fi rst place. This goal underpins the drafting of many key human rights principles—
such as the absolute prohibition against the arbitrary denial of the right to life 
(Article 6 ICCPR), and any use of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment (Article 7 ICCPR) 42 ; prohibition against arbitrary arrest or detention 
39  UN Action Agenda 2012, 5–6. 
40  Samuel, White and Salinas de Frías 2012, 1. 
41  This is equally true of the principle of due diligence, which is often linked to the principle of 
prevention, and its resultant obligations on state offi cials. See, for example, the Guiding Principles 
on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect, and Remedy’ 
Framework (21 March 2011) UN Doc A/HRC/17/31, para 6. 
42  See too Art 2(1) Convention against Torture 1984 (CAT) which states: ‘Each State Party shall 
take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to  prevent acts of torture in any 
territory under its jurisdiction’. 
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(Article 9 ICCPR), and discriminatory treatment (Article 26 ICCPR)—as well as 
other provisions aimed at the humane and fair treatment of, for example, detainees 
or accused persons to prevent their mistreatment or any unfairness (Articles 10 and 
14 ICCPR). Recognising that these protections are often not fully afforded in prac-
tice, human rights instruments also make provision to deal with the consequences of 
their violation, such as civil remedies (Article 2(3) ICCPR) and in some cases crimi-
nal sanctions (Article 4 CAT), 43 which similarly have an overarching objective of 
deterrence to prevent future recurrences. It is evident, therefore, that overarching 
human rights goals can have the effect of producing coherent, and therefore more 
effective, norms and mechanisms. 
 The human rights regime, however, is not without its own challenges in terms of 
developing consistent approaches, notably the interpretation and application of key 
principles, as the principle of prevention reveals. Notably, there is no universally 
agreed defi nition of prevention. Consequently, its normative parameters are not 
entirely clear, illustrated by the spectrum of recent governmental as well as inter-
governmental counter-terrorism efforts. Here, the concept of “prevention” and its 
associated legal or at least legitimate responses have meant anything from sanctions 
on state and non-state actors, to reliance upon often broadly or ambiguously drafted 
anti-terrorism legislation, administrative detention which can be indefi nite in nature, 
military courts and commissions not affording full fair trial guarantees, question-
able interrogation methods which can be coercive in nature, targeted killings of 
suspected terrorists including through the controversial use of drones, and expul-
sions which seek to (mis)use the framework for the protection of refugees and 
asylum- seekers for counter-terrorism purposes. 44 The absence of clearer parameters 
poses a further obstacle to ensuring adequate levels of accountability and to closing 
existing or potential impunity gaps. 
 Other internal coherence challenges exist too, that have implications for the 
adoption of broader approaches on human rights themes in a transitional justice 
context. ESC rights are often different in their normative framing compared with 
civil and political rights. In contrast to ICCPR provisions, which are often framed in 
clear prohibitive and/or preventive terms, the substance of ESC provisions tend to 
be framed as positive obligations to make progress towards their realization rather 
than in preventive terms. 45 This is illustrated by the text of the International Covenant 
for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966 (ICESCR), where “prevention” is 
only expressly mentioned in relation to preventing “epidemic, endemic, occupa-
tional and other diseases” (Article 12(2)(c) ICESCR), and permitting certain 
43 Art 4 CAT provides that: ‘Each State Party shall ensure that all acts of torture are offences under 
its criminal law.’ 
44  Samuel, White and Salinas de Frías 2012, 1, 18–35. 
45  General Comment 15, See for example para 18: “States parties have a constant and continuing 
duty under the Covenant to move as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards the full 
realization of the right to water.” 
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restrictions to be lawfully imposed on the exercise of the Covenant’s rights by mem-
bers of the armed forces or the police in the administration of the State. 46 
 That said, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) has 
attempted to overcome at least some of these diffi culties in its General Comments 
through its interpretation of some positive treaty obligations to include a preventive 
element. For example, the obligation on States Parties “to  prevent third parties from 
interfering in any way with the enjoyment of the right to water.” 47 Other obligations 
too have been interpreted in a way that implies preventive strands, such as the obli-
gation to  respect which “requires that States parties refrain from interfering directly 
or indirectly with the enjoyment of the right to [e.g.] water” 48 ; as well as an obliga-
tion to  fulfi l which can be “disaggregated into the obligations to facilitate, promote 
and provide…” 49 and “requires States parties to adopt the necessary measures 
directed towards the full realization of the right to water.” 50 There can also be pre-
ventive aspects associated with these rights, such as the duty upon States parties 
under their international obligations “to  prevent their own citizens and companies 
from violating the right to water of individuals and communities in other countries”. 51 
A preventive element may also take the form of a duty of abstention on States par-
ties, illustrated by the requirement of “non-interference with the exercise of cultural 
practices and with access to cultural goods and services”, 52 unless there are legiti-
mate reasons for doing so. 53 Additionally, one of the clearest forms of prevention in 
the ICESCR is the overarching prohibition against discrimination in the exercise of 
its rights. 54 
 In practice though, many of these positive ESC obligations with preventive 
elements are more diffi cult to determine than their civil and political rights counter-
parts, particularly since a determination usually needs to be made between whether 
a government was unwilling or genuinely unable through resources constraints to 
46 Article 8(2) ICESCR. 
47  General Comment 15 2003, para 23, emphasis added. 
48  General Comment 15 2003, para 22. 
49  General Comment 15, para 25. 
50  General Comment 15 2003, para 26. 
51  General Comment 15 2003, para 33, emphasis added. 
52  General Comment 21 2009, para 6. 
53  General Comment 21 2009, paras 17–19. 
54 Articles 2(2) and 3 ICESCR, There is no separate principle of non-discrimination in the ICESCR 
in contrast to Art 26 ICCPR. See for example CESCR, General Comment 20: “Non-discrimination 
in economic, social and cultural rights” (art. 2, para. 2, of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights), UN Doc E/C.12/GC/20 (2 July 2009), para 8 which states that ‘States 
parties must therefore immediately adopt the necessary measures to prevent, diminish and elimi-
nate the conditions and attitudes which cause or perpetuate substantive or de facto discrimination. 
For example, ensuring that all individuals have equal access to adequate housing, water and sanita-
tion will help to overcome discrimination against women and girl children and persons living in 
informal settlements and rural areas.’ 
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meet an obligation. 55 Furthermore, it may also be necessary to establish that the 
government concerned failed to act in good faith. 56 That said, some ESC rights are 
now considered to be non-derogable including the duty to prevent disease in relation 
to the right to water. 57 
 It is evident that a number of ICCPR and ICESCR provisions expressly or 
impliedly incorporate preventive elements, though it is often easier to prove the 
violation of, as well as to enforce, civil and political compared with ESC rights. 
Furthermore, it is apparent that some of the related internal coherence challenges 
within the human rights regime can be overcome or at least mitigated through the 
interpretative approaches adopted. This is important too if the rhetoric that no hier-
archy exists between civil and political rights and ESC ones is to become more of a 
reality in practice, making the achievement of the sought broader goals of transi-
tional justice more realisable. 58 
 Transitional Justice Policy Goals and General 
International Law 
 As the discussion so far has revealed, signifi cant tensions and associated normative 
challenges exist between the rhetoric of broader transitional justice goals (for 
instance, seeking to better incorporate ESC rights) and their achievement in prac-
tice. Additionally, the analysis has shown that principal explanations for these 
include the challenges of attaining normative coherence not only internally within a 
particular legal regime but also externally in terms of how the norms and goals of 
one regime interact with those of another. 
 With respect to the issue of internal normative coherence, as the discussion of 
human rights and the principle of prevention illustrate, one way of achieving or at least 
improving this is through the tool of interpretation. The question therefore remains 
whether this and/or other tools exist that can improve the external interaction of 
norms. This is central to whether and how broader transitional justice policy goals, 
which are centred on the triangular relationship existing between the UN’s three 
pillars: development, peace and security, and human rights, may be realisable. 
55  General Comment 15 2003, para 41, ‘A State which is unwilling to use the maximum of its available 
resources for the realization of the right to water is in violation of its obligations under the 
Covenant. If resource constraints render it impossible for a State party to comply fully with its 
Covenant obligations, it has the burden of justifying that every effort has nevertheless been made 
to use all available resources at its disposal in order to satisfy, as a matter of priority, the obligations 
outlined [here].’ 
56  General Comment 15 2003, para 40. 
57  General Comment 15 2003, paras 37 and 40. 
58  Though no hierarchy exists between these rights in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
1948 (UDHR), arguably the subsequent division of these rights into the ICCPR and ICESCR intro-
duced an unhelpful distinction between them that did not exist previously, arguably making the 
UDHR more progressive as an instrument. 
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 In terms of possible tools, that of interpretation is of particular signifi cance. As 
the ILC Fragmentation Study noted, “the precise relationship between two or more 
rules and principles that are both valid and applicable in respect of a situation” is not 
confi ned to situations of confl ict, equally it may be one of interpretation: “This is the 
case where one norm assists in the interpretation of another. A norm may assist in 
the interpretation of another norm for example as an application, clarifi cation, 
updating, or modifi cation of the latter. In such situation, both norms are applied in 
conjunction.” 59 Certainly, one possible way of diffusing and reconciling at least 
some of the discernible differences existing between the three pillars may be for 
specifi c principles—such as prevention—to be interpreted through a common para-
digmatic lens, for example that of human rights, in order to produce a common 
narrative between them. One NGO during the consultation process that took place 
prior to the Rio Summit suggested that:
 The language and action of a Human Rights Based Approach is key to the paradigm shift and 
serves as an overarching guide to systemic change. Focusing on the protection and realization 
of human rights, it provides a framework that addresses the most marginalized and excluded 
in society, strengthening social, political, economic and environmental justice and equity. 
Human rights principles (e.g., participation and inclusion, accountability) can drive every 
activity, across any sector and become part of the design, implementation and monitoring of 
sustainable development policies and programs. The Human Rights approach coexists with 
many key Rio Principles—including common by differentiated responsibilities, access and 
participation, gender equality, polluter pays and the precautionary principle—that should 
remain part of any new vision because they intimately tie together the three pillars. 60 
 Though the task of developing such common narratives will be complex and no 
doubt often contentious too, it is by no means an impossible one. In fact, the signifi -
cant potential benefi ts of doing so are illustrated by the detailed analytical study 
undertaken by the Offi ce of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in 2008 on 
the relationship between climate change and human rights. Its overall conclusions 
were that a broad number of human rights were interfered with by climate change 
that states were under a legal obligation under international human rights law to 
protect. 61 As Dunoff observes, “[t]he goal of this effort is nothing less than a recon-
ceptualisation of the climate issue” beyond being solely a scientifi c issue. 62 Certainly, 
the need for some form of a “global, overarching, cross-thematic framework for 
development after 2015…” 63 has been advocated by inter alia civil society in rela-
tion to the shortcomings of the MDG framework. The recognised need for human 
rights based accountability, including participation rights, and transparency to 
improve governance and institutions for global sustainability, enforced by effective 
accountability mechanisms, 64 should be achievable across the three pillars. 65 
59  ILC Fragmentation Study 2006, conc 2. 
60  UN-NGLS Report 2011, 7. 
61  See further OHCHR Report 2009. 
62  Dunoff 2012, 171. 
63  UN-NGLS Report 2011, 7. 
64  UN-NGLS Report 2011, 20. 
65  UN-NGLS Report 2011, 15. 
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Indeed, alternative paradigmatic lenses could take the form of broader concepts 
such as transparency, accountability, or legitimacy. 66 
 Though it may be possible to bring increased coherence to the interpretation of 
specifi c principles within different legal regimes by interpreting them through a 
common paradigm, this will not be possible in all cases due to some inherent 
features of international law. For example, where greater coherence is sought in 
relation to treaty norms, despite the rules of treaty interpretation contained in Article 
31 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, there may be different national 
approaches to the interpretation of the same treaty provision within a particular 
regime. As Matz-Lück observes:
 The content of the norm as determined by interpretation is crucial for the establishment of 
the parties’ rights or obligations. Yet often the different elements of interpretation allow for 
a wide array of conclusions concerning a norm’s meaning and content. A drafting practice that 
keeps treaty language deliberately vague in politically contested fi elds gives considerable 
room to the individual party in the interpretation process. 67 
 Further challenges may be posed by the very nature of public international law, 
which is predominantly non-hierarchical in nature. Therefore, with the limited 
exception of  jus cogens norms, there is little in the way of guiding principles or 
standards determining which interpretative approach should prevail over another 
where normative confl icts arise. Furthermore, it would appear that the very nature 
of specialist regimes is that overall uniformity of standards is not an objective of 
their law-making activities or developments. Instead it is important that, “standards, 
norms and procedures specifi cally designed to address a certain issue shall not be 
sacrifi ced in the name of coherence”, 68 so that they remain fi t for purpose. That said, 
“specialisation must not mean that either the wheel has to be reinvented concerning 
the underlying fundamentals of a transnational legal regime or that interdependence 
resulting from an overlap of issues, defi nitions, parties, fi nancial mechanisms and, 
generally, being part of the same overarching legal system, should be completely 
neglected”. 69 
 Such differences may be mitigated through, for example, the authoritative inter-
pretations of judicial bodies, though these too may not be consistent in their 
approaches, illustrated by the diversity of national, regional, and international 
approaches to determining the scope and effect of Article 103 UN Charter. 70 
Alternatively, some form of tacit or express agreement regarding the interpretation 
of particular principles may be reached between interested parties, which may 
66  Dunoff 2012, 139. 
67  Matz-Lück 2012, 210. 
68  ILC Fragmentation Study 2006, conc 2(13) 4, Conclusion 2 (13) states: ‘ Effect of the “special-
ity” of a regime . The signifi cance of a special regime often lies in the way its norms express a 
unifi ed object and purpose. Thus, their interpretation and application should, to the extent possible, 
refl ect that object and purpose.’ 
69  Matz-Lück 2006, 209. 
70  For example,  Kadi and Al Barakaat (2008),  R ( Al-Jedda )  v Secretary of State for Defence (2007), 
 al-Jedda v United Kingdom (2011), and  Sayadi and Vinck v Belgium (2008). 
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afford greater certainty—at least between those parties—but have the disadvantage 
of being less authoritative. Associated challenges here include the infrequency of 
relevant cases before the International Court of Justice (which may in any event 
interpret the parameters of the issues before it narrowly) (for example,  Kosovo 
Advisory Opinion (2011)) to determine clear principles and guidelines of the resolu-
tion of normative confl icts. 
 A different approach may be to “consider the utilisation of norms [for example, 
when interpreting treaty texts] stemming from other regimes as interpretative guid-
ance in a broader sense, i.e. as an idea rather than a clear methodological approach”, 71 
with different degrees of integration achievable dependent upon particular instru-
ments and contexts. This might be easier to achieve in practice as it would not 
require formal consensus, and would allow more fl exibility to refl ect the specialist 
nature of particular norms depending on the context (Matz-Lück 2012, 209–210). 
At the very least, such an approach might lead to the crystallisation of overarching 
elements relevant to each of the three regimes, resulting in increased systematic 
coherence. 72 Certainly, drawing upon other international law instruments (i.e. ones 
broader than those applicable to one particular regime), aimed at striking a balance 
between increased unity among the corresponding norms of different regimes while 
retaining their necessary specialist diversity, might strengthen their cross- 
fertilisation. 73 A primary benefi t of such an approach would be seeking to minimise 
the areas of normative tension and difference between the three UN pillars’ legal 
regimes to achieve improved inter-regime coherence based on common principles 
and standards. As Matz-Lück suggests, “a systemic vision of public international 
law would be promoted by the open approach to take into account all relevant instru-
ments. At the same time the interpreting institutions would be fl exible to choose 
which instrument they fi nd the most helpful in order to reach effective solutions for 
the understanding and further development of their regime.” 74 
 Some potentially problematic issues with such approaches exist though. One is 
the unresolved “question of who has the competence to interpret an international 
treaty by taking into consideration norms which were agreed in a different context 
and setting and, potentially, by different parties”. 75 The situation is not assisted in 
some instances by the paucity of international jurisprudence offering defi nitive or 
guiding principles in such circumstances. Furthermore, “[u]nless the parties decide 
collectively on the interpretation of a provision by authoritative interpretation, there 
is hardly any clear guidance on the understanding of a norm.” 76 Indeed, those who 
interpret these norms, particularly at the governmental and intergovernmental levels, 
may be enticed to engage in unhelpful, unpredictable or even arbitrary “cherry 
picking” of interpretations that suit their purposes which may not (fully refl ect) 
71  Matz-Lück 2012, 209. 
72  Matz-Lück 2012, 211. 
73  Matz-Lück 2012, 232. 
74  Matz-Lück 2012, 232. 
75  Matz-Lück 2012, 212. 
76  Matz-Lück 2012, 213–214. 
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well established rules on treaty interpretation. 77 Such weaknesses are refl ective 
of broader characteristics of international law, namely the presence of “not very 
much in terms of an informing meta-principle from which answers can be deduced 
by the application of a reason, or a shared allegiance to the system of law amongst 
the actors who deal with it” 78 ; what Dunoff describes as the absence of a “redemptive 
narrative”. 79 
 A related, yet different scenario is when international tribunals or courts are 
engaged in the interpretation of norms, for example in the context of dispute settle-
ment, when they are required to consider regime interaction. As Dunoff observes, 
the nature of litigation is that it:
 ….involves a highly atypical form of regime interaction….obscur[ing] the most common—
and most important—forms of the phenomena under study. Just as importantly, a focus on 
courts is of limited utility as international judges lack the jurisprudential tools necessary to 
resolve the doctrinal tensions that arise when diverse international legal regimes overlap and 
collide. As a result, analysis of judicial decisions sheds little light on the causal mechanisms 
through which regimes impact upon and infl uence each other. 80 
 Furthermore, litigation is by its very nature retrospective. Consequently, Dunoff 
argues in favour of a broader, forward projecting, paradigmatic approach of what he 
terms “relational interactions”: “[I]nstead of searching for  the governing norm, 
relational interactions explicitly acknowledge that multiple regimes often can and 
do exercise concurrent authority over actions or events. Hence, relational interac-
tions are often directed towards the articulation of new international norms to 
prospectively govern behaviour within a particular area of international relations. 
Thus these interactions are often ‘juris-generative’, or law-creating.” 81 Such an 
approach would attach greater signifi cance and infl uence to non-judicial contexts 
where inter- regime interactions are more commonplace. 
 Another possible solution may be to consider parallel principles drawn from 
different regimes through the prism of the principle of harmonisation. As the ILC 
Fragmentation Study suggests:
 In case of confl icts or overlaps between treaties in different regimes, the question of which 
of them is later in time would not necessarily express any presumption of priority between 
them. Instead, States bound by the treaty obligations should try to implement them as far as 
possible with the view of mutual accommodation and in accordance with the principle of 
harmonization. 82 
 This approach seeks to interpret international norms “so as to give rise to a single 
set of compatible obligations”, 83 achieved through mutual consent so far as this is 
77  Matz-Lück 2012, 233. 
78  Crawford and Nevill 2012, 259. 
79  Crawford and Nevill 2012, 259. 
80  Dunoff 2012, 137. 
81  Dunoff 2012, 138. 
82  ILC Fragmentation Study 2006, conc 26. 
83  ILC Fragmentation Study, 2006, conc 4. 
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achievable. Diffi culties with such an approach may include where any of the 
principles concerned have  jus cogens status, which are not only non-derogable, but 
must prevail over any incompatible “inferior” norms. 84 
 Of particular relevance here is the potential for sustainable development to be 
utilised as an overarching framework for the resolution of norm-confl icts. Over the 
past 20 years, the concept has been increasingly relied upon in institutional and judi-
cial settings to seek to bridge normative and institutional divides. For the purposes of 
this chapter, it is not possible to develop the argument in full—nor is it necessary to do 
so in full in the transitional justice context. But certain key themes have developed that 
are of relevance. First, sustainable development has a conceptual quality that spans 
both intergovernmental negotiation and judicial resolution, thus bringing together 
policy and law, not invariably seamlessly but certainly providing much broader 
scope for reconciliation. For instance, reliance by the concept by the World Trade 
Organization Appellate Body in its  Shrimp-Turtle (1998) dispute, in which the 
Appellate Body recognised that sustainable development provided “colour, texture 
and shading to our interpretation of the agreements” is perhaps particularly notice-
able in this regard. Of course, the Appellate Body was able to rely upon the inclusion 
of sustainable development within the express wording of the preamble of the WTO 
Marrakech Agreement to justify this reference. However, it is equally apparent from 
the jurisprudence of both the International Court of Justice and arbitral tribunals that 
sustainable development has an autonomous form that exists outside of treaty texts. 
Very famously, the International Court of Justice in  Case Concerning Gabčíkovo-
Nagymaros Project ( Hungary / Slovakia ) (1997), remarked that “[t]his need to recon-
cile economic development with protection of the environment is aptly expressed in 
the concept of sustainable development”. 
 And though this has been subject to much debate and contention as quite what 
was meant by this, the International Court of Justice has—in a measured fashion—
reaffi rmed, and given  some effect to this meaning in the later  Case Concerning Pulp 
Mills (2010) by noting the “interconnectedness between equitable and reasonable 
utilization of a shared resource and the balance between economic development and 
environmental protection that is the essence of sustainable development” (para 90). 
Of particular interest here, is not the reference to equitable utilisation of water-
courses, the specifi c context in which it was used, but rather the integration of tradi-
tional legal reasoning and more recent policy-cum-normative import. On the one 
hand, it is the case of the latter (recent innovation) informing the former (pre- existing 
legal rules), to the enrichment of the former, but equally there is more going on here; 
there is an attempt at more holistic synthesis which is worth noting; the standards, 
norms and expectations of both are integrally linked. A similar approach comes 
across in the arbitral tribunal award in  Iron Rhine (2005), in which the tribunal noted 
in a remarkably discursive manner the importance of an evolutive  interpretation 
of treaty in the face of “strict application of the intertemporal rule”, thus ensuring 
“an application of the treaty that would be effective in terms of its objective and 
purpose” (para 80). 
84  ILC Fragmentation Study 2006, conc 42. 
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 This is not to suggest that sustainable development is somehow a theory-of- 
everything, which will either provide the normative answer to all these issues 
of fragmentation or invariably has within itself substantive coherence, but it has 
provided a useful tool for courts and tribunals to try to reconcile competing claims 
and disparate objectives. As described above, it is most usefully viewed when seen 
as an element of interpretation. Indeed, whenever there is an attempt to move beyond 
that and to provide it (or similar concepts) with substantive content, there is a genu-
ine reluctance amongst both States Parties and judicial bodies to confuse and con-
fl ate treaty obligation and non-treaty principle. Thus, if no more than an exemplar 
of what can be achieved through such open-concepts, sustainable development 
highlights the benefi ts (and challenges) of fi nding cross-cutting tools to assist with 
interpretation and integration. 
 So, returning to the question posed whether or not broader transitional justice 
policy goals are normatively achievable within the current framework, the answer 
must be that this is certainly possible. General international law offers a number of 
tools, including interpretative approaches, tools of harmonisation, as well as the 
jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals. It is apparent too that in some 
circumstances interpretative solutions may well lie within the legal regimes of the 
three pillars themselves, such as using the concept of sustainable development or 
human rights principles as lenses through which to interpret parallel norms in pur-
suit of normative coherence. Increased integration and coherence will only be pos-
sible however to the extent that the necessary political will is present to overcome 
the associated complexities and potential obstacles. 
 Conclusion 
 In coming to the end of this chapter, we would argue that there are, in principle, three 
reasons to consider transitional justice in the broader context of the international 
legal order. First, that as the goals and rules relating to transitional justice are very 
much part of the international political and legal order, general issues of normative 
fragmentation are as relevant to its deliberation as any other. Secondly, that as tran-
sitional justice contains within its very rationale the integration of disparate areas of 
regulation, it invariably requires reconciliation between, and amongst, such rules. 
The previous discussion of the principle of prevention has highlighted both the 
potential for a cross-cutting norm, as well as the challenges for its implementation. 
Thirdly, there are a number of meta-, or overriding, principles which might assist 
with developing an overarching coherence, including the concept of sustainable 
development and various principles of human rights. 
 The fi rst conclusion is that though transitional justice has its particular normative 
demands and requirements, we would argue that there is no  lex specialis evolving 
around it, perhaps in contrast to the emerging policy and institutional framework 
that has been developing in parallel, particularly during the last 20 years. This is not 
to say that such a  lex specialis will not develop, nor that over time this would not 
necessarily be a good thing. Rather, we see a divergence between the speed of 
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progressive policy initiatives in the area of transitional justice in contrast to the 
development of accompanying legal principles and rules to effectively implement 
them. And the consequential effect is that transitional justice remains subject, to a 
greater or lesser extent, to a patchwork of general rules of international human 
rights, humanitarian, criminal, and environmental law, inter alia. To that extent, 
transitional justice also benefi ts—and suffers—from the same challenges of general 
international law, and will need to take advantage of any secondary rule or process 
that general international law has to offer. 
 The second conclusion is that since transitional justice is invariably premised 
upon integration of a range of policy areas to achieve a reasonably broad, but still 
identifi able outcome, namely an ordered peace and reconciliation (in whatever form) 
in a post-confl ict situation, the above conclusion—that of the relevance of, and reli-
ance on, international law—becomes especially signifi cant. This breaks down further 
into two aspects, namely the further evolution of, and identifi cation of specifi city in, 
relevant primary norms (for example, the principle of prevention) especially as a 
means of promoting cross-cutting relevance; and secondly, the development and 
refi nement of secondary rules of reconciliation and interpretation. As noted above, 
secondary rules cannot by themselves achieve policy objectives, though they do play 
an important role in their instrumentalization. 
 In particular, the above discussion on the principle of prevention reveals a myriad 
of meanings across a diverse array of legal sub-disciplines, with a greater or lesser 
degree of convergence—few of which are specifi c to the transitional justice context. 
There is a job-of-work to do to consider whether greater harmonisation is possible 
and specifi cally within the particular situation of post-confl ict societies, but until 
there is political will to do that, the international community will need to rely on the 
rather generic nature of the primary norms. And this is where the secondary rules of 
interpretation and reconciliation potentially come into their own, providing decision- 
makers, institutional frameworks, and judicial bodies the discretion if they so wish 
to exercise it to model a bespoke response within the accepted parameters of what 
the international community originally intended for the primary norms. Thus, within 
this context, and as the discussion on the principle of prevention reveals, normative 
diversity abounds and despite the appeal of an easily defi ned obligation, discerning 
shared and common assumptions is, in fact, hugely complicated as well as inher-
ently political. 
 Finally, it seems appropriate to note the relevance of meta- or overarching prin-
ciples to provide both normative coherence and mediation between legal regimes. 
The rule of law and human dignity, for example, might both provide starting points 
for the development of a more holistic legal regime. Particular reference was made to 
sustainable development. This has relevance both in the general tension between the 
environment and development, in which it has found clearest expression, but also 
potentially more specifi cally within the context of transitional justice. This is not to 
suggest that it provides an all-embracing norm, as clearly it does not. Sustainable 
development may have things to say, for instance about good governance, but clearly 
it is stretching the concept to include matters of criminal justice and reconciliation. 
Nevertheless, as one amongst a number of meta-principles that could be used to 
provide an overarching normative framework for transitional justice—a framework 
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that as has already been noted is not yet fully elaborated—it will provide a necessary, 
if not suffi cient, aspect. To the extent that the policy imperatives inherent within 
transitional justice are a priority for the international community, this is an area in 
need of urgent reform, as well as an interesting ongoing experiment in law-develop-
ment. But this is not legal specialisation in a policy or legal vacuum; transitional 
justice as both a policy and legal objective does not eschew, but indeed benefi ts from, 
precepts and techniques of the general legal order. 
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